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RATIONAL CHOICE AND REASONABLE INTERACTIONS
BRUCE CHAPMAN*
I. STRATEGIC AND RATIONAL INTERACTIONS
Game theory offers us an account of how rational agents interact in
strategic situations. The situations are strategic in that the determination of
rational conduct for any one agent will depend upon what that agent be-
lieves another agent in the interaction might do. Of course, this other agent
will also typically be working out her own strategy in light of the beliefs
she has about the first agent and what the first agent might do. Thus, a ra-
tional agent needs to think not only about what to do, but also about what
another agent is thinking about what to do and, further, about what that
other agent is thinking about what the first agent is thinking about what to
do. And so on. In non-cooperative game theory this thinking, while quite
sophisticated, and having as its subject matter the thoughts and actions of
another, remains very private. Each agent typically works out what to do,
or how to interact with another, as a matter of private rationality.
All of this is familiar. What is less familiar, perhaps, is that the law
and legal theory also contain an account of how rational agents interact.
However, it is an account of how rational agents interact, and how they
understand their interaction, under the idea of public (or objective) reason-
ableness. More straightforwardly, we might say that law and legal theory
offer an account of how "reasonable persons" interact. While this terminol-
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ogy might sound more familiar, it runs the risk of suggesting only that law
adds some normative assessment of a rational agent's conduct into the mix,
something in which non-cooperative game theory, as a predictive or de-
scriptive tool, would not claim to have much of an interest. But in this pa-
per I want to emphasize the public or objective nature of reasonableness as
something distinct from private rationality, and argue that, in taking this
more public orientation, the legal account provides a different interpreta-
tion of what an interaction between rational agents is, not simply how it is
assessed. Indeed, I shall argue that the law's account has important advan-
tages over the game theoretic version for explaining the levels of coordina-
tion and cooperation that we observe amongst rational agents.'
Effectively, I will be arguing that while game theory can claim to offer
an account of how rational agents interact, unlike law and legal theory, it
cannot make the further claim that it provides an account of rational inter-
action. As I will be suggesting this is a crucial deficiency in game theory, it
is worthwhile having some sense early on of what I mean by the distinc-
tion. Certainly a good deal of highly sophisticated reasoning and rationality
is exercised by game theoretic agents. The thoughts that occur to rational
players in a strategic game ("I think that she thinks that I think," etc.) are
often so complicated that it is sometimes difficult even to articulate them.
Moreover, the subject matter of each player's thoughts is the thoughts of
another, and so in this sense the reasoning might even be thought to be
"social."'2 But how "social," or public, are they really? A player's rational
thoughts, once replicated, are "socialized" in a sense, in that they become
the thoughts of all the other players at some level. But in another sense
what is replicated or socialized is still only the stuff of individual thoughts.
When I am thinking about what you are thinking, there is definitely some-
thing intersubjective going on. But, as a different point of emphasis, we
also have to concede that our mutual intellectual engagement is still only
intersubjective. Our private thoughts are overlapping, perhaps, in that they
are "of each other" or "of each other's thoughts," but there is no real ra-
tional interaction, at least if we mean by interaction the idea that we meet
one another in some public space.
Of course, the game theorist will say that interaction is at the very core
of the theory of games. The players interact when each chooses a strategy,
1. Some of the empirical (experimental) literature that shows people have a tendency to coordi-
nate and cooperate at higher levels than game theory predicts is nicely surveyed in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
2. Ariel Rubinstein defines game theory as "an abstract inquiry into the concepts used in social
reasoning when dealing with situations of conflict." Ariel Rubinstein, Comments on the Interpretation
of Game Theory, 59 ECONOMETRICA 909, 909 (1991) (emphasis added).
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say a row or column in one of the familiar matrices depicting a two person
game, and these different choices combine, or interact, to produce a final
outcome, that is, some given cell within the overall array of possibilities.
What could be more interactive than that? But my claim is that, however
interactive this may be, it is not an account of rational interaction. For when
there is interaction between players in the theory of games, it is causal
rather than conceptual; each player simply determines a part of the world (a
row or a column) as a matter of individual choice, and the determination of
each part determines the whole as a causal matter. But there is no interac-
tion in a shared conceptual space. So when there is interaction it is not ra-
tional interaction. On the other hand, when there is something rational, the
rational is, perhaps, intersubjective, but it is not interactive. The players
think, of course, and even think through each other's private thoughts, but
they never think together in some more public, or objective, conceptual
space. Thus, when there is something rational, it is not interactive, and
where there is something interactive, it is not rational. There is never, there-
fore, any moment where there is a rational interaction.
I am sure that all this will continue to strike some readers as somewhat
mysterious, especially the idea that agents can "think together," something
that risks conjuring up the (nonsensical) notion of a "group mind."'3 Per-
haps it will help to see how the law provides the very sort of account of a
rational interaction that I think is lacking in the theory of games. I turn to
this in the next section. With this understanding of the law's account in
hand, we will be in a better position in section III to see, by way of some
simple examples, how such an account can help in the theory of games.
II. THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLE INTERACTIONS
In his important discussion of common law liability for unintentional
harm, Oliver Wendell Holmes reminds us of the special sort of interest that
law has in the idea of individual responsibility, an interest that law does not
always share with ethical theory.4 Holmes asks us to consider the defendant
in a tort action who has done the best he can to avoid injury to the plaintiff
3. Philosophers are typically very careful to avoid any suggestion of a shared mental state, even
when their arguments appear to bring them close to the possibility. For example, in a paper discussing
"shared intention," Michael Bratman cautions that a shared intention is not "an attitude in the mind of
some superagent." Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 ETHICS 97, 99 (1993). John Searle makes
a similar point: "[T]alk about group minds ... [is] at best mysterious and at worst incoherent. Most
empirically minded philosophers think that such phenomena must reduce to individual intentionality."
John R. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401, 404 (Philip
R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990).
4. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 104-29 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881).
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but, because of his particular ineptitude, has not been successful in doing
so. 5 On any ethical standard, Holmes suggests, it would be hard to fault the
defendant for injuring the plaintiff; how can there be moral fault in doing
everything one can to avoid such an injury? Yet, in a passage that is now
well-known and much quoted for its rejection of the relevance of these
subjective abilities for a judgment of legal fault, Holmes remarks:
If... a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and
hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be
allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome
to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors
accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard,
and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation
into account.6
The neighbors' standard, of course, is the objective standard of the
reasonable person, and, while Holmes thought (in his typical fashion) that
such a standard was ultimately justified because it was more conducive to
the public welfare, the more general point was that law concerns itself with
what is appropriate as a standard of behavior for the man in interaction
with his neighbors rather than what is fair as a subjective matter to the man
considered on his own.
This difference in what is the proper concern of law as distinct from
ethics is also, of course, much emphasized by Kant. In his Doctrine of
Right, or that part of The Metaphysics of Morals which deals with his phi-
losophy of law, Kant argues that law concerns itself only with what he calls
the "universal principle of Right," or the coexistence of everyone'sfreedom
in accordance with a universal law. 7 "[A]nyone can be free," says Kant, "as
long as I do not impair his freedom by my external action, even though I
am quite indifferent to his freedom or would like in my heart to infringe
upon it.' '8 By contrast, "[t]hat I make [the universal principle of Right] my
maxim to act rightly is a demand that ethics makes on me." 9
Thus, across a broad range of theories, and over a significant span of
time, there has been agreement that law (or, at least, private law) attends to
what is right between the parties linked by an interaction rather than what is
right or ethical as a matter internal to one of the parties. Law is not con-
cerned with a person's thoughts in so far as they do not impact upon an-
other, that is, in so far as they are not acted upon and do not have any
5. Id. at 86.
6. Id. at 86-87.
7. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 24 (Mary Gregor trans., 1996) (1797).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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potential for interaction. And when they are acted upon, and have some
interactive effect, what does matter for law is not what an individual might
mean to do as a private matter, but what she does as a public matter, that is,
what she (actually) does under a publicly accessible, or (objectively) rea-
sonable, understanding.
While this is true for law in general, it is particularly important for
contract and consent, where parties set out to do something together, that is,
where they choose to engage in cooperative activities. 10 For example,
whether two parties have a contract for the sale of, say, "new oats" or "old
oats"'11 will not depend on whether there is a meeting (or overlap) of their
(private) minds on this issue. Rather, the court will attend to the most plau-
sible public understanding of the transaction and deem the contract to be
for "old oats" if that is the most (objectively) reasonable meaning of its
terms in the context in which contracting occurred. Indeed, even where
subjectivity does seem to be important, for example, in the criminal law,
what the accused will have to attend to as a subjective matter (as a matter
of, say, honest belief implicating subjective states of mind like intent,
knowledge, recklessness, etc.) will be a public or shared (objective) under-
standing of what the concept of right conduct requires. Thus, it will not be
enough in the case of a sexual assault, for example, for the accused to say
(even honestly), "I thought (in my mind) that in her mind she was consent-
ing," if there was no reasonable, or public, manifestation of that consent. 12
The accused's appeal to his thoughts about her thoughts, while exemplify-
ing the same intersubjectivity that is characteristic of strategic thinking in
the theory of games, is inadequate because for law the subject matter of his
(subjective or honest) belief is insufficiently objective. What the accused
needs to be able to establish is that he had an honest belief in a reasonable
10. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 201- 17 (1999).
11. See Smith v. Hughes, where a buyer refused oats that the seller had delivered on the grounds
that he had meant to buy old oats, whereas the oats delivered were new. [1871] 6 L.R.Q.B. 597. For
excellent discussion of the case under the idea of a public rather than merely intersubjective understand-
ing ("the meeting of minds" idea), see Brian Langille & Arthur Ripstein, Strictly Speaking-It Went
Without Saying, 2 LEGAL THEORY 63, 76-77 (1996).
12. The facts of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan come to mind. [1975] 2 All E.R. 347.
After an evening out, Morgan, the accused, invited some of his friends to come back to his house and
have intercourse with his wife. Somehow, contrary to the truth, he managed to convince them that she
would likely feign her resistance, but that she would be willing nevertheless. One issue was whether the
friends' honest beliefs in her consent, no matter how unreasonable in the face of her manifest unwill-
ingness, were enough to undermine the mens rea requirement for their assaults. The House of Lords,
reversing the Court of Appeal on this point (although upholding the conviction of the accused), held
that the friends' honest but mistaken beliefs were enough to undermine the mens rea requirement.
Needless to say, the House of Lords decision on this point of law has been controversial. For a good
discussion, see E. M. Curley, Excusing Rape, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325 (1976).
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manifestation of her consent, that is, he needs to be thinking about her con-
sent or cooperation as a publicly comprehensible matter. 13
This means that, under law, two parties who are acting together will
have the separate individual actions that make up their cooperative activity
linked conceptually under some objective or public understanding. Thus, if
each party is to understand what her separate obligations are, or what (in
law, at least) she should do, she will have first to consult that shared under-
standing of what it is that they are doing together ("Is this a contract at all?"
"Is this a contract for old oats?"), and only then ask what she should do
under that shared understanding of the cooperative venture. This may seem
obvious enough, but it is important to appreciate that, unlike for game the-
ory, this does mean that the interaction of the parties is a rational interac-
tion. Each party orders her individual action in the cooperative venture as a
part of a conceptual whole that likewise also orders the individual action of
the other party. In this sense, the parties first meet or interact together in
some common conceptual space. Of course, it will be the individuals them-
selves who ultimately act out their respective parts of the cooperative plan
as understood in this public way, and at this point the interaction (part with
part) might appear to be only an interaction between rational individuals (as
in the usual game) and not a rational interaction. But it is precisely because
each action (while individual in the causal sense) is ordered by a shared or
public conceptual scheme (part with whole) that the interaction of these
(rational) individuals is a rational interaction or, as law would articulate
this idea, a reasonable one. It now remains to see how this idea of a rea-
sonable interaction might be helpful in the theory of games.
III. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION: RATIONAL AND REASONABLE
Consider the following very simple two person game in which two
friends, Row and Column, would like to meet for lunch at one of two res-
taurants, Andy's or Bob 's. Unfortunately, they have made no prior ar-
rangement and each must choose without the benefit of having already
agreed with the other about where to go. 14 In Figure 1, this choice is repre-
13. Sometimes this is expressed as a requirement that his belief in her consent be honest and
reasonable. But that is problematic because it obscures too much the distinction that properly exists
between the (subjective) fault standards that are appropriate for criminal law and those (objective
standards) that are appropriate for private law. It is more accurate to say that in criminal law the accused
must have an honest (subjective) belief in what is an objectively reasonable (public) manifestation of
consent. Without that, he is at least guilty of a reckless indifference to what right conduct requires as a
matter of law. For a discussion, see Bruce Chapman, Responsibility and Fault as Legal Concepts, 12
KtNG'S C. L. J. 212 (2001). See also RIPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 202-14.
14. In an earlier article published in this law review, I have argued, using this same example, that
the problem that these two friends face is not significantly changed, at least within the logic of game
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sented for each of the friends as the choice between A (for Andy's) and B
(for Bob 's), with Row choosing between the two rows and Column be-
tween the two columns. The payoffs to each friend are indicated by the
numbers in each cell of the matrix, with the first number being the payoff
to Row and the second the payoff to Column. Each friend is assumed to
know this representation of their situation and that each is rational. Further,
all of this knowledge is assumed to be common knowledge (that is, not only
does each know the game form representation and that he or she is rational,
but also each knows that each knows this, each knows that each knows that
each knows this, and so on). 15
Figure 1:
Column
A B
A 4,4 0,0
B 0,0 2,2
It might seem that there is a reasonably obvious thing for each friend
to do here. Since they both much prefer lunch together at A to lunching
together at B, then each should choose A. But, strictly speaking (at least
according to strategic reasoning), that is not what the game form matrix
shows. Row should indeed choose A, but only if Column also chooses A.
Otherwise, she should choose B. For her to choose A when Column
chooses B would result in one of her two least satisfactory outcomes. The
problem, of course, is that she does not know what Column has chosen to
do. Indeed, as she thinks about it a little more, she will conclude that Col-
umn will not yet have chosen a restaurant himself. For he is working out
the same problem at his end and he too is stymied; alas, until she chooses,
theory, even if they have made some prior verbal arrangement about where to meet. See Bruce Chap-
man, Common Knowledge, Communication, and Public Reason, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1151, 1164-69,
1175-84 (2004).
15. It has become (itself) conventional to credit David K. Lewis with the first formulation of the
concept of common knowledge, DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION 52-60 (1969), and Robert J. Aumann
with the first rigorous formulation, demonstrating its fundamental importance for game theory, Robert
J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS OF STAT. 1236, 1236-39 (1976). However, for a recent
argument that suggests there are important differences between Lewis's account and that which has
been imported into game theory by way of Aumann, see Robin B. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, Common
Knowledge, Salience, and Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis' Game Theory, 19 ECON. &
PHIL. 175 (2003).
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he cannot choose either! This is the impact of seeing the situation as one of
strategic interdependence. 16
Notice that there are views that Column could have about Row which
would avoid any problem for Column in working out what to do. For ex-
ample, if it was Column 's view that Row would simply, and somewhat
thoughtlessly (compared to Column), go to the restaurant where she most
preferred to lunch with Column, namely at A, then Column would have no
difficulty conditioning on Row's choice of A and would choose A himself.
Note that Row does not have to actually be this sort of parametric thinker;
it is enough that Column thinks she is. And if Row knows that Column
thinks this of her, then she too will head for A.
But, under our assumptions, none of this is possible because Column
gives Row more credit as a rational actor than that. Column recognizes that
Row is every bit as rational as he is and, therefore, in this mirror image
situation, he imagines her to be working out a mirror image problem. In
this limited respect, therefore, Column thinks of his own reasoning as "so-
cial" (or at least "socialized"); it is replicated by other rational agents in the
same situation, and that replication is reintroduced into his own thinking as
something that he thinks about. Indeed, that is at least partially responsible
for what is so paralyzing here. For when he thinks that like-minded Row is
thinking about what he is thinking and, further, is thinking about what he is
thinking that she is thinking, he realizes that there can, as yet, be no choice
16. Someone might be tempted to think that Row (and, analogously, Column), faced with uncer-
tainty as to which restaurant Column will choose, will deem Column just as likely to choose A as B.
But then Row should choose A since the expected payoff is higher for her under A than B given this
equal probability assumption. Further, under common knowledge of rationality, Column will think of
Row thinking this and choose A himself. Thus, each of the two friends will choose A with certainty and
end up at Andy's. Unfortunately, this reasoning is invalid because it generates a contradiction. The
argument begins by assigning a one-half probability to the prospect of the other agent choosing A, but
concludes that the probability of the other agent choosing A is not one-half but one. Having derived a
contradiction, one should reject the argument. For good discussion of this difficulty, see Nicholas
Bardsley, Collective Intentions Revisited: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy 8-9 (July
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review) available at
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/staff/detais/papers/coint-julyO4.pdf; Natalie Gold & Robert
Sugden, Theories of Team Agency 4-5 (March 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Chi-
cago-Kent Law Review) available at http://www.econ.uoa.gr/UA/files/2117196129.pdf. The only
probabilities that Row (and, analogously, Column) could assign to the prospects of Column choosing A
and B, without generating this sort of contradiction, are one-third and two-thirds, respectively. This is
hardly surprising as these probabilities form the only Nash equilibrium for the game in mixed (or
random) strategies and, therefore, they are the only probabilistic strategies that are reinforced (or, at
least, not contradicted) by the rational thoughts of each agent as he or she thinks through the rational
thoughts of the other under common knowledge of rationality. For discussion of the idea of Nash
equilibrium, and how it relates to the common knowledge of rationality assumption, see infra, note 17.
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by Row (for example, to choose A) upon which he can condition his own
choice (to choose A).17
However, consider the following variation on this game, a variation
that allows Row to unambiguously choose A as a rational matter, that is, in
a manner consistent with the rationality assumptions that are typical of
game theory. In Figure 2, the payoffs are changed for Row and show that
she would like to eat at A regardless of what Column might choose to do.
Of course, just as in Figure 1, in Figure 2 Row would most prefer to eat at
A together with Column. Column's payoffs are unchanged; he would prefer
most to eat together with Row at A, but failing that, just as before, he
would prefer to eat with her at B rather than eat alone.
Figure 2:
Column
A B
A 4,4 3,0
B 0,0 2,2
In this game, Row will head for A regardless of what Column chooses
to do. We say that Row has a dominant strategy to choose A. Moreover,
Column (knowing the structure of the game form matrix) knows this of
Row and, therefore, knows that he should go to A to meet her. (The game
is solved by the method of iterated dominance; first, Row chooses A by
strict dominance and, second, Column chooses A, since, given that Row
chooses A, A now dominates B for Column as well.) Moreover, Row like-
wise knows all this of Column, and so can predict quite easily, and happily,
that, as she heads for A, she will meet Column there.
17. Formally, the problem here is that there are two (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in this game.
"A Nash equilibrium is an array of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an incentive
(in terms of improving his own payoff) to deviate from his part of the strategy array." DAVID M. KREPS,
GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 28 (1990). In a single play game, the equilibrium notion
shows up in the idea that, under common knowledge of rationality, only Nash equilibria can survive the
recursive thought processes of individuals thinking through the rational thoughts of another before they
play their strategies. For suppose one agent thought of playing some non-Nash strategy that was advan-
tageous to her (but, because it is a non-Nash outcome, obviously did not contemplate the other agent
playing his most advantageous reply). Then, under common knowledge of rationality, the other agent
would think that the first agent was thinking that and, being rational, would respond by adopting the
most advantageous reply after all. The only outcomes, once contemplated as outcomes by one agent,
which are reinforced by the contemplations of the other equally rational agent, are Nash equilibrium
outcomes. The problem in Figure 1, of course, is that there is an embarrassment of riches: there are two
Nash equilibria that survive these recursive thought processes and, therefore, there is still some inde-
terminacy for each agent in thinking about what to do.
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But now consider a variation of the Figure 2 game that has a much
less happy result. In Figure 3, the game has begun to look a bit more like a
(one-sided) prisoner's dilemma. The payoffs for each of the two friends at
A have been reduced so that they now prefer, when they lunch together, to
lunch at B. That is, while Row continues to prefer to lunch at A regardless
of what Column chooses, when she lunches together with Column, she
prefers to lunch at B. (Perhaps she considers the dishes at B to be easier to
share.) Column continues to prefer to lunch together to lunching alone, and,
when lunching together, like Row, he prefers to lunch at B.
Figure 3:
Column
A B
A 1,1 3,0
B 0,0 2,2
Can these two friends rationally get to Bob's together? It seems not.
The same reasoning that took each of them to Andy's in Figure 2 takes each
of them to Andy's in Figure 3. Given a choice of A by Column, Row would
choose A; and given a choice of B by Column, Row would choose A as
well. So Row must, surely, choose A. What (at least in game theoretic
terms) could possibly make her choose otherwise? And, given that she
chooses A so rationally, how can Column rationally choose other than to go
to A as well? Thus, Row will go to A regardless of what Column chooses,
and Column, knowing this of Row, will go to A to meet her.
While the result is an unhappy one for the two friends (that is, it is
Pareto-inferior to the outcome where they lunch together at Bob's), it is
hard to deny that it is the rational result for them given the structural nature
of strategic reasoning. Strategic reasoning, it will be recalled, conditions
the rationality of a choice of action by one agent on a choice of action by
the other. Put differently, but equivalently for the game form matrix in
Figure 3, the rationality of an action (say, the choice of a row by Row or a
column by Column) is the rationality of that choice of row (or column)
given a certain column choice by Column (or row choice by Row). And,
surely, it is tempting to ask yet again: How could it be otherwise? Rational-
ity for each of the two friends goes to the rationality of his or her individual
actions, where Row chooses row by row, and Column chooses column by
column. There can be no question of what it is to choose rationally in any-
thing other than a strictly vertical (row by row within a given column) or
[Vol 81:75
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horizontal (column by column within a given row) direction. Choices in a
diagonal direction (or choices for Row outside a given column or for Col-
umn outside a given row) are simply not available as choices for any one
individual. 18 Thus, if rationality or reasoning is to govern choices, and
choices are ultimately made by individuals, then it is natural to think that
the rationality of an action for one individual is the strategic rationality of
that action given the choice of action by another.
However, while natural enough, strategic rationality is not the only
way to think about how rationality and reasoning might govern individual
choices in cases of social interaction. An alternative form of reasoning, one
that is exemplified, I think, in the law's idea of a reasonable interaction,
while conceding that choices are ultimately made by individuals, might not
assess the rationality of these individual actions directly, but could derive
their rationality from a prior assessment of the rationality of a pattern of
actions for the group of individuals taken as a whole. In other words, the
rationality of a part-some individual action-is derived from the rational-
ity of the larger whole of which it is a part.19 1 will (hoping that I can avoid
some of the baggage that comes along with this term) refer to this alterna-
tive way of thinking or reasoning about one's individual action as holistic.
But, as already suggested from our discussion of the law, one might also
want to label this sort of thinking as reasonable.
This alternative form of holistic reasoning about individual choices,
even when replicated across all the agents in identical situations within
some social interaction, has important implications for the problems our
two friends have been confronting in choosing to meet at a restaurant. Con-
sider first the pure coordination problem that we observed earlier of our
two friends, Row and Column, in Figure 1.20 The problem of coordination
arises under strategic reasoning because what is rational for each agent to
do depends so crucially on what the other agent chooses to do. Under stra-
18. See Christopher Woodard, Group-Based Reasons for Action, 6 ETHICAL THEORY AND MORAL
PRAC. 215, 217 (2003).
19. Id. at 219.
20. It is fast becoming conventional in some circles to refer to the Figure 1 game form more
particularly as a "Hi-Lo" game, a name that captures the idea that, while there is no conflict of interest
in the game (the interests of the players are perfectly aligned over the different possible outcomes,
reducing their problem to one of coordination only), one of the pair of Nash equilibrium payoffs is
higher for each player than another. The more general term, "pure coordination game," is now increas-
ingly reserved for the game where the payoffs in the two Nash equilibria pairs are the same. When the
pairs of payoffs are the same, no outcome stands out for the players, and it truly seems difficult for each
player to decide what to do; there is, therefore, a real (or "pure") coordination problem. However, the
point of much of the discussion in this paper is to show that, when the payoffs are Hi and Lo, while
coordination might not seem so problematic, it continues to be so for players restricted to Nash-like
thinking. For this reason I continue to refer to the Figure 1 game as a pure coordination game. For
further discussion, see Gold & Sugden, supra note 16, at 4.
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tegic reasoning, each agent asks, what should I do (given my thoughts
about what the other agent might do)? However, under the alternative more
holistic approach, Row and Column each ask themselves first, what is it
that we should do here? (Each answers easily: We should meet. Where? At
Andy's.) And then they ask themselves second, and what is it that I do
when we do that? (Just as easily each answers: I should choose A.) 21
Of course, the first question does require each of the two friends to
make a diagonal comparison in Figure 1, a comparison that neither friend
can immediately follow through on as a matter of individual choice. But the
second question returns each to the issue of what action he or she should
choose as an individual. In particular, each friend should choose that row or
that column which allows each to do his or her part in the achievement of
the outcome deemed most rational (here, meaning best in terms of prefer-
ences) for the group as a whole. However, while individual actions must
ultimately follow the strict vertical and horizontal contours of the game in
this way, a prior assessment of what is rational in individual action need
not. It is a peculiar feature of the sort of reasoning that game theory con-
templates of interacting agents that it simply assumes that the empirical
requirements of individual action must somehow be reproduced in an indi-
vidual's prior assessment of that action's rationality. But there is no obvi-
ous reason why our conceptual world should track what is possible in the
causal world in just this way. The causal world or, more particularly, how
individuals act upon or interact with each other in some shared physical
environment, could be informed by, or track, some independent judgment
that we make of our actions (together) as a purely conceptual matter.22
21. The holistic reasoning being contemplated here is akin to the sort of reasoning that Michael
Bacharach has characterized as "we" thinking, something that he contrasts with the more usual "[/he"
thinking that we see in game theory. See Michael Bacharach, "We" Equilibria: A Variable Frame
Theory of Cooperation 5 (June 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Michael
Bacharach, Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Co-operation, 53 RES. IN
ECON. 117, 143 (1999). Robert Sugden's "team reasoning" is also closely related. See Robert Sugden,
Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior, 10 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 69, 84-
89 (1993); Robert Sugden, Team Preferences, 16 ECON. & PHIL. 175, 182 (2000); Gold & Sugden,
supra note 16. For a collection of recent essays, see TEAMWORK: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
(Natalie Gold ed., 2005). For philosophers' account of the "we-frame" idea, see Raimo Tuomela &
Kaarlo Miller, We-Intentions, 53 PHIL. STUD. 367 (1988); and Gerald J. Postema, Morality in the First
Person Plural, 14 LAW & PHIL. 35 (1995).
22. See Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical Reason, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1169
(2003), for development of this argument more generally (that is, in a way that looks for its implications
in the theories of individual choice and social choice as well as the theory of games) under the idea of
"categorical reason." All the discussion of the "causal" as distinct from the "conceptual" in the text at
this point should not suggest that what is in play here is the same distinction that separates "causal
decision theory" from "evidential decision theory." On the latter distinction, see ROBERT NOZICK, THE
NATURE OF RATIONALITY 41-63 (1993). The evidential decision theorist takes how another might
behave (e.g., a Newcomb predictor, another similarly situated prisoner in the prisoner's dilemma) as
evidence (sometimes) of how you should behave even though there is no causal connection between the
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Consider now the problem in Figure 3, which is not, strictly, a pure
coordination problem, although it shares the feature with Figure 1 that both
friends would very much like to find a way to lunch together at one of the
two restaurants rather than the other. Again, strategic reasoning identifies a
dominant strategy for Row to choose A, and then, given (the predictability
of) Row's choice of A, Column chooses A as well, despite the fact that
both friends can see this coming and would be better off each choosing B.
However, under the alternative more holistic approach to reasoning through
their predicament, each friend again asks himself or herself, what is it that
we should do here? The answer for Column would appear to be as easy as
it was before, only this time it identifies a different restaurant: We should
meet, says Column. Where? At Bob 's. (Whether the questions and answers
are in fact as easy as this for Column, who must also, even under holistic
reasoning, take into account how the situation has changed for Row, is a
question I will return to momentarily.) But what about Row? Given her
preferences over the four possible outcomes in the game, Row has some
difficulty even articulating a common conception of what the two friends
might do. She seems not to be able to say easily that "We should meet for
lunch. Where? At Bob 's," since her most preferred outcome is, first, to eat
alone and, second, to do so at Andy's. This, after all, is one of the crucial
differences between Figures 1 and 3. However, she also cannot easily say
that "We should eat alone," as this contemplates the possibility that she
might eat alone at Bob 's, her least preferred outcome. What she has to say
in answer to the question about what "we" should do is something less
categorical and more particular, something like, "We should eat alone, but
only if I eat alone at Andy's and you at Bob 's; otherwise we should eat
together at Bob 's."23
other's behavior and the payoffs you face. This sort of thinking (while allegedly more "informed" by
what others are doing) is still highly individualized or private, and differs, therefore, from what is being
envisaged when your conduct as an agent is informed by a shared conception or understanding of what
it is that you are doing as one part of a larger whole.
23. 1 have tried to suggest elsewhere that the difficulties that some agents might face in articulat-
ing for others a shared conception of what they should do as a group might be useful if certain difficul-
ties in social choice theory are to be avoided. See Chapman, supra note 22, at 1195-1203; Bruce
Chapman, More Easily Done Than Said: Rules, Reasons and Rational Social Choice, 18 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 293 (1998). The problem, as here, is that the agent cannot organize the particular action
proposed under categories of thought that the other agents might share. "Eating alone," for example, is
not unambiguously (or categorically) better, or worse, than "eating together." In these earlier papers I
relate this problem to some of the domain restrictions in social choice theory (in particular, Sen's "not
between" value restriction) that are sometimes required if stable social choices (e.g., where there are no
majority voting paradoxes) are to be ensured.
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This obviously leaves something to be desired as a categorical call to
rational action for the two friends.24 Moreover, it fails in this respect for
two reasons. First, the call to action is so infused with particularity that it
hardly seems categorical at all; there really is no common conception here
that informs action by each of the two friends. In other words, there is no
common conception of their interaction (as reasonable) that informs their
individual actions as rational (that is, that renders them "sensible" under
some common conception), and it is this that we were seeking under the
alternative more holistic approach. Second, given his preferences, such a
highly particularized call to action by Row is hardly likely to be acceptable
to Column; after all, it calls for an interaction which results in one of his
least preferred outcomes. Moreover, under our common knowledge as-
sumptions, Row can anticipate this reaction from Column. Therefore, Row
can anticipate that Column will fail to find this call to action rational, at
least in the holistic sense, not only because it seems so unorganized by
general categories of thought that they can share, but also because, even as
a particularized call to action, it is so contrary to the preferences that Col-
umn has.
However, it is only the first deficiency that I really want to emphasize
here. In part, this is because one can imagine Row also saying to Column
that his categorical call to action (to lunch together at Bob's) is very con-
trary to her preferences. Indeed, we could intensify her preference for lunch
alone at Andy's by giving her a payoff of five rather than three for that
outcome, all without changing the decisive structure of the game in Figure
3 (i.e., from the point of view of strategic reasoning the game would still
have the same "solution" under iterated dominance), and then Row could
say of Column that his categorical call to action is more costly to her than
her particularistic call to action is costly to him (supposing that these pay-
offs were cardinally comparable utilities and that costs are measured as
departures from each friend's most preferred outcome). So this contrary-to-
preference notion of a non-rational call to action cannot do much work to
distinguish Row from Column. But the non-categorical or highly particu-
laristic nature of Row's call to action does seem to distinguish her from
Column. Column's call to action can organize the respective contributions
24. Of course, no actual "call to action" is being contemplated here, as there is (by assumption) no
actual conversation between the friends. Rather, what is being contemplated by each friend is only a
thought experiment, albeit one that is a little more "public" than what goes on in strategic reasoning.
The friend asks herself (silently) whether her conception of what they are (reasonably) doing (or what
they ought to do) is something that the other friend can (reasonably, sensibly) be expected to share.
Only then can the conception order what each will do together. Row should see that her call to action is
not one that is likely even to occur to (or be conceived by) Column.
[Vol 81:75
RATIONAL CHOICE AND REASONABLE INTERACTIONS
of each friend to the overall social interaction under some general category
of thought that each can share ("What am I doing in choosing B? I'm doing
my part in us getting together for lunch at Bob 's."). But in Row's call to
action ("We should eat alone, but only if I eat alone at Andy's and you at
Bob 's; otherwise we should eat together at Bob 's."), there seems to be no
such general category or concept that can pose as the "whole" of which
action by each friend is some part.
Notice too, if we return to the situation where Row's preference for
lunching alone at Andy's is intensified to the point where she has a payoff
of five in that outcome, that while the decisive structure of the game again
remains the same from the point of view of strategic reasoning (i.e., it is
solved by iterated dominance), now there is a holistic call to action that
could be quite categorical for Row, and it is a call to action that would
avoid the Pareto-inferior outcome where both friends lunch together at
Andy's. Now she could say, "We should each choose our restaurant such
that total (or average) overall utility is maximized," and then, by choosing
A, she could go on to do her part in that shared conception of the friends'
interaction (again supposing that these payoffs are interpersonally com-
mensurable cardinal utilities). Moreover, if Column shared that conception
of their interaction, then he too would know to do his part by choosing B.
(This illustrates how Column's call to action under a shared conception of
the interaction must take into account how the situation might change for
Row; even though his own payoffs are unchanged after the payoff to Row is
changed, the change in payoff to Row makes available to Column, as much
as to Row, a shared categorical conception of the interaction, where Row
eats alone at Andy's, that was not available before the change.) Again, this
indicates that what does the real work here in a categorical or holistic call
to action, and what avoids the Pareto-inferior outcome where each friend
chooses A, is that it is holistic or categorical, not that it is consistent
(somehow) with the preferences of all the interactors. 25 After all, under an
interaction where the shared conception is that each friend does his or her
part in the maximization of total overall utility, a shared conception that
also helps these friends to avoid choosing the Pareto-inferior outcome, the
25. This also shows that what is being proposed in this paper to solve coordination games where
one of the Nash equilibria is Pareto-superior to another is to be distinguished from the mere addition of
something like a joint dominance principle. For examples of the latter approach, see David Gauthier,
Coordination, 14 DIALOGUE 195 (1975); KREPS, supra note 17, at 31 (a cautious endorsement of this
approach in limited circumstances). A shared conception of oneself as a total or average utility maxi-
mizer will avoid Pareto-inferior outcomes without necessarily endorsing the relevant Pareto-superior
outcome. In other words, under such a shared conception, some (but not all) agents might be made
worse off. This is hardly surprising, of course, as what is being proposed here is something that is "team
rational," not something that is "individually rational."
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result can be, as it is here, significantly contrary to Column's preferences.
Note too that the result under this shared conception of their interaction is
not merely a coordinated choice between Nash equilibria, but, more
strongly, a coordinated choice of a non-Nash equilibrium.
These variations in the examples suggest, not surprisingly, that differ-
ent shared conceptions of an interaction are available, and that these differ-
ent shared conceptions will differently inform agents about what each
should rationally (and individually) do (as his or her part) under that shared
conception. The possibility of quite different shared conceptions will also
suggest that there is a good deal of indeterminacy for an individual agent in
thinking about what he or she should rationally do, something that might
have one wondering whether our two friends are much helped, in their
attempts to get to lunch together, by these more holistic ideas. The skeptic
might conclude that the problem now is only that our two friends need to
coordinate their sense of "shared conceptions," a problem that does not
seem, perhaps, all that much more easy to solve than the problem of coor-
dinating their individual actions more directly.
I do not intend to argue in any length against that criticism here, al-
though even this conclusion does suggest that our social institutions, in-
cluding our legal institutions, will have a quite different problem of
coordination to address from what is more conventionally supposed.26
However, it does strike me that this skeptical conclusion is also very likely
wrong. There will be fewer degrees of freedom for individual action under
the thought that one's (preferred) action must be disciplined, first, by a
conception of what it is that one is doing and, second, by a conception of
what it is that we are doing, that is, by a conception of our interaction that
is capable of being sensibly shared. The different categories and concepts
that organize the actions of different individuals will have to fit together in
a "sensible" way, and if these categories and concepts are shared, then it
26. Two points need to be emphasized. First, when the law addresses coordination in the way
suggested here, it does not address a coordination game, that is, the problem of how best to coordinate
actions by individuals (e.g., by making some actions more salient than others). On this it contrasts with
the interesting argument in Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1649, 1651-52 (2000). Rather, the law should address more general understandings or conceptions
of action and interaction, developing and/or reinforcing these general understandings so that coordina-
tion games are solved as a matter of individual reasoning, through a particular shared conception, to the
choice of an action. Second, when the law does this, it will help individuals to avoid more than just the
problems modeled by coordination games, even coordination games where there is some conflict of
interest (as in the game of chicken or the battle of the sexes game, both discussed by McAdams, id. at
1672-89). If the examples in this section are any indication, a shared conception of their interaction
may well help the interacting agents to solve problems modeled by the prisoner's dilemma as well. That
is, such an approach might encourage the agents to choose not only between Nash equilibria, but also to
choose non-Nash equilibria.
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seems reasonable to think that the actions of the different individual actors
will have to fit together in a sensible way as an interaction. At a minimum,
if there are fewer degrees of freedom for rational individual action under
shared conceptual schemes than there are under individual preferences,
even the common knowledge of such individual preferences, then one
might expect fewer problems of coordination and, further, as our examples
have suggested, fewer problems of cooperation than the standard game
theoretic literature suggests.
However, even if the skeptic were to concede this point as a theoreti-
cal matter, he might still want to argue that there is little evidence that ra-
tional agents actually interact in this way rather than in the more strategic
way that is contemplated by the game theorist. To this I can be more defini-
tive in my reply. There is good experimental evidence that agents in game
theoretic situations actually do reason this way. Consider, for example,
what Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky discovered about how subjects play
the familiar two-person prisoner's dilemma game, a game very similar to
what appears in Figure 3.27 In their experiment, the rate of cooperation in
the prisoner's dilemma was 3% when the subjects knew that the other
player had defected, and 16% when they knew that the other player had
cooperated. One might well have expected some rate of cooperation be-
tween 3% and 16% when the subjects were uncertain whether the other
player had cooperated or not. However, when the subjects were confronted
with this uncertain situation, the rate of cooperation rose significantly to
37%, a number that cannot even be rationalized as some weighted average
between the strategically formulated actions "cooperate given that the other
cooperates" and "do not cooperate given that the other does not."
Shafir and Tversky attribute this pattern of responses to the different
conceptions or understandings that a subject will have of her choice situa-
tion depending on whether she knows if the other player has already made
his choice of strategy.28 When she knows that the other player has already
chosen his strategy, whether it is to cooperate or not to cooperate, the sub-
ject thinks of herself as acting "on her own." Given the choice of the other
player, she alone will determine the final outcome of the game. This en-
courages her to bring a highly individualistic perspective to bear on her
choice of strategy, a perspective that leads her more naturally to choose
against cooperation. However, in the uncertain situation, where all four
possible cells of the prisoner's dilemma game are still very much in play,
27. Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning
and Choice, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449 (1992).
28. Id. at 457-58.
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the outcome of the game is to be determined by a combination of the strat-
egy choices of both players taken together. Shafir and Tversky argue that
this provides for a more collective understanding of the situation, and from
this more collective point of view the optimal strategy for both parties is to
cooperate. Thus, say Shafir and Tversky, it is less surprising that coopera-
tion is chosen more frequently in this situation.29
These results support the argument that individual agents in a game
theoretic situation behave differently depending on how they conceive of
the choice they are being asked to make.30 So there seems to be more than
preference and information variables involved in these choices. Moreover,
these differences are such that when the choices are presented to them in
the causally interactive way that game theory most often contemplates (that
is, when the choices are presented to them under the conception, "this is
still to be determined by our combined actions," or "it's up to us," rather
than "this is to be individually determined," or "it's up to me"), the indi-
vidual actors think about what to do as something that they should do to-
gether. That is, each thinks first under the diagonal comparison, "what
should we do?," and then lets that judgment inform how he or she acts
individually. In this section I have tried to suggest, by way of some simple
examples, that this can help these individuals both to coordinate their ac-
tions and to avoid certain non-cooperative outcomes that might make them
all worse off.
CONCLUSION
The analysis that I offer here is highly preliminary. The details are
certainly far from worked out, and the approach may fail fundamentally,
either as a way to understanding better why people coordinate and cooper-
ate in game theoretic situations, or as an account of what is a reasonable
cooperation in the law. I hope only to be suggestive about what might be
29. Id.
30. For related arguments that a change in how a player conceives or "organizes" a given pris-
oner's dilemma game can affect how a player might play the game, even when the payoffs and informa-
tion (or beliefs) for all the players in the game are unchanged, see Frederic Schick, A Dilemma for
Whom?, 140 SYNTHESE 3, 3-6 (2004); David Schmidtz & Sarah Wright, What Nozick Did for Decision
Theory, 28 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 282, 287-88 (2004). The different "conceptions" or "ways of
seeing" the prisoner's dilemma as a situation in which one finds oneself (that is, as a matter of fact in
terms of payoffs and information) are represented as different ways in which a given player "partitions"
the possible actions of another player. These actions by the other player can be conceived by the first as
"he chooses A" or "he chooses B" (that is, conceived as the same sorts of independent choices that the
given player faces); alternatively, they can be seen as "he chooses the same" or "he chooses differ-
ently." These authors argue that these are different ways of conceiving a given prisoner's dilemma
game (with given payoffs and information), and that a player will play quite differently under the
different conceptions.
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possible under a quite different approach, one that law already makes
available. But if I am right in making the suggestion, the returns are large.
Not only are we closer to understanding why people coordinate across mul-
tiple Nash equilibria, that is, in the cases of pure coordination games or
coordination games where there might be some conflict of interest (e.g., the
game of chicken or the battle of the sexes), but also we might be able to
understand better why people choose to cooperate and coordinate around
non-Nash equilibria-something that challenges game theory as an account
of social interactions at a very fundamental level indeed.

